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Vargas v. J. Morales, 138 Nev. Adv. Op. 38 (June 2, 2022)1
CIVIL PROCEDURE: RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT UNDER NRCP (60)(b) IS
GENERALLY UNJUSTIFIED AFTER 14 MONTHS OF INACTIVITY.
Summary
The Nevada Supreme Court reversed the district court’s order granting respondent NRCP
60(b)(1) and (6) relief from a prior judgment and remanded for proceedings consistent with the
reversal. The Court held that (1) an NRCP 60(b)(1) motion is untimely when 14 months have
elapsed since the judgment was entered and (2) that relief under NRCP 60(b)(6) is unjustified
where it would have been available under NRCP 60(B)(1) if timely.
Facts and Procedural History
The respondent, and owner of the property where the incident alleged by the appellant
occurred, was sued in a premise liability action. The complaint in the action was filed and served
in February of 2018, and despite acknowledging receipt of the complaint, the respondent failed
to respond, appear, or participate in the action until his bank account was garnished pursuant to a
judgment of default two years later.
In October 2020, the respondent moved to have the judgment set aside and execution
stayed under NRCP 60(b). The respondent attributed the failure to respond to the complaint to
‘mistake or excusable neglect’ under NRCP 60(b)(1), claiming he relied on the faulty advice of
his insurance agent that since he was not the premises owner at the time of the alleged incident,
he was not liable for the injury or the damage. In the interim, the respondent sought relief under
NRCP 60(b)(6) on “any justifiable grounds”.
The District Court granted the respondent’s motions under NRCP 60(b)(1) and (6). The
appellant appealed.
Discussion
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal
In a de novo review, the Supreme Court of Nevada determine whether the lower court
erred in granting the respondent’s motions for relief from judgments under NRCP 60(b)(1) and
(6).
On appeal, the respondent challenged the jurisdiction of the Court, citing Adams v.
Fallini2, arguing that the instant appeal was from a non-appealable order. Contrary to this
assertion, however, the Court distinguished the facts of the present case Fallini, pointing out the
case’s exclusive discussion about fraud which was not at issue here. Additionally, the Court
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Est. of Adams By & Through Adams v. Fallini, 132 Nev. 814, 386 P.3d 621 (2016) (holding that an order for
relief from judgment on the grounds of fraud is non-appealable).
2

added, it had jurisdiction over NRCP motions granted more than 60 days after the entry of
judgment, pursuant to NRAP 3A(b)(8).
The district court abused its discretion in granting NRCP 60(b) relief
The Court noted that a district court’s decision on motions shall not be disturbed unless for an
abuse of discretion. Citing Willard v. Berry-Hinckley Industries,3 the Court identified a decision
that disregards legal principles as an abuse of discretion.
JMI’s NRCP 60(b)(1) motion was untimely
As to the respondent’s substantive claims related to entitlement to relief under NRCP
60(b)(1) and (6), the Court determined that the claim for relief due to mistake or excusable
negligence exceeded the ‘reasonable’ amount of time prescribed by the statute.4 The Court did
not suggest that a timely motion under the provision would have been unsuccessful.
NRCP 60(b)(6) relief was unavailable
The Court, citing its recent decision in Byrd v. Byrd5, further determined that relief under
NRCP 60(b)(6) was also improper as “any other reason” relates to those reasons not already
enumerated in the statute.
Conclusion
The Court ultimately held that the district court erred in granting the respondent’s NRCP
60(b)(1) motion, filed 14 months after entry of the default judgment because it was untimely, and
that the lower court erred in granting the NRCP 60(b)(6) motion because the statute was
impermissibly applied as a subterfuge to circumvent the time limits that apply to a request for
relief based on NRCP 60(b)(1).
The case was reversed and remanded for proceedings in accordance with the opinion.
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NRCP 60(c)(1) sets forth a 6-month limit on NRCP 60(b) motions.
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